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Abstract
An emerging body of work has critiqued the concept of climate adaptation, highlighting the
structural constraints impeding marginalised communities across the Global South from being
able to adapt. This article builds on such work through analysis of debt-bonded brick workers in
Cambodia, formerly small farmers. It argues that the detrimental impacts of climate change
experienced by farmers-turned-workers across the rural – urban divide is due to their precarity.
In doing so, this article draws on a conceptualisation of precarity which recognises it as emerging
from the specific political economy of Cambodia, and as something that is neither new, nor confined
to conditions of labour alone. As such, in looking to precarity as a means of conceptualising the
relations of power which shape impacts of climate change, we advance a ‘climate precarity’ lens as a
means of understanding how adaptation to climate change is an issue of power, rooted in a specific
geographical context, and mobile over the rural–urban divide.
Keywords
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Introduction
Cambodia, in keeping with regional and global trends more broadly (Krellenberg et al.,
2016), is undergoing a rapid process of urbanisation. Between 1998 and 2018, the country’s
urban population grew by an estimated 197% (calculated from National Institute of
Statistics (NIS), 2016), a key factor in which have been the agricultural pressures
engendered by climate change. Cambodia is repeatedly cited as one of the most climate
insecure countries globally (see UNDP Cambodia, 2014). The result of repeated
environmental shocks and stresses over recent decades has contributed to a process of
rural–urban migration, as smallholder farmers, who constitute the mainstay of the
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country’s agriculture (Beban and Gorman, 2017; Ovesen et al., 2012), are forced to find non-
farm work to sustain their livelihoods under changing conditions (Bylander, 2015a, 2015b;
Parsons, 2017).
Migration is well established as a form of climate change adaptation in literature on
Cambodia (Bylander, 2015b) and more widely (Black et al., 2011; McLeman and Smit,
2006; Tacoli, 2009). Furthermore, more recent work has developed this focus, highlighting
the complexity of articulating factors, which may include climate change, that drive
population movement (Adger et al., 2012), including a focus on more subjective causal
factors (see Parsons, 2019). Beyond opening up the ontological basis for understanding
climate change adaptation, research has also highlighted the problematic assumptions of
unconstrained agency which underpin earlier approaches to climate adaptation, looking
instead to how power structures adaptive efforts (Adger et al., 2003; Ribot, 2011). In this
vein, we suggest that there remains scope to better theorise power as a relational
phenomenon, thus highlighting how climate change mediates livelihoods through broader
structures (Taylor, 2015). This is particularly pertinent given the wealth of literature which
theorises power in labour relations outside climate literature.
This article therefore looks to address this lacuna through a focus on debt-bonded brick
kiln workers in Cambodia, forced to migrate from rural livelihoods across Cambodia due to
agrarian distress, which is affected by climate change. In following the trajectories of small
farmers-turned-debt-bonded brick workers, we highlight that rather than escaping climate
change-induced shocks that plagued their livelihoods in rural areas, they are forced to
confront it once again on the kilns, in the form of heavy and unseasonal rains. These
rains force work to stop on the kiln, and compel debt-bonded workers to increase their
borrowing from kiln owners for daily expenses during such periods. Consequently, the
impacts of climate change continue to deepen the livelihood insecurities of farmers-
turned-workers across rural–urban spaces, highlighting the structural constraints
preventing migration being an effective form of adaptation.
In order to develop our understanding of power in this regard, we draw on the concept of
precarity to situate both the material relations and experiences of farmers-turned-brick-
workers in relation to climate change and to the wider economy.
Whilst human security approaches have been the predominant means of theorising power
within literature on climate change adaptation (see O’Brien et al., 2007), as Taylor argues,
‘. . . work within the human security and environmental change paradigm tends to identify
the centrality of power and inequality without providing clear analytical tools with which to
analyse them’ (2013: 320). Drawing on literature which conceptualises precarity as being
both an issue of the labour market (Waite, 2009) and a concept that is broader in scope in
capturing lived experiences (Ettlinger, 2007), we suggest that precarity offers a more spatially
and structurally coherent approach for exploring adaptation to climate change, or the
inability to do so. Rather than being a phenomenon from which people escape, the
impacts of climate change are shown to span the rural–urban divide, as small farmers
from villages become brick workers in and around Phnom Penh, complicating notions of
fleeing from climate change-distressed rural livelihoods.
This article also contributes to a dearth of literature which conceptualises precarity
outside of the Global North (Munck, 2013), and in particular, outside of countries that
have undergone a Fordist labour regime (Millar, 2017). We thus look beyond the normative
underpinnings of precarity when applied to Global North, Fordist cases, to re-root this
concept in the particular context of ‘unfettered and intense marketization’ and the ensuing
labour market engendered in the Cambodian context (Springer, 2010: 6). We ultimately
develop a ‘climate precarity’ lens, which looks to better theorise relational power in the
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study of climate adaptation. This builds on approaches foregrounding vulnerability (see
Taylor, 2013), but draws instead on the concept of ‘precarity’ as a means of better
situating smallholder farmers-turned-brick workers in relation to the broader political
economy.
Overall, this article offers two distinct contributions to literature on climate change
adaptation and on precarity, respectively. Firstly, the article builds on the work of Taylor
in particular (2013, 2015), moving beyond his focus on agrarian spaces alone, to suggest that
climate change adaptation is a process borne out over rural–urban spaces and is most aptly
understood through the relational power of those ‘adapting’, where power is understood as
being forged and reproduced by broader structural determinants. From this standpoint, the
discussion of power vis-à-vis climate change adaptation is linked to a rich discussion of the
changing relations of power within the labour market and economy of the Global South.
Secondly, the article develops the lens of precarity to suggest that when it is situated in a
regional political economy, it offers a means of understanding the particular subjective
experience and objective relations of a faction of the labouring poor. The article thus
ultimately utilises the ‘climate precarity’ lens put forward here, as a means of drawing on
the conceptual insights of precarity as both subjective and objective to better understand the
vulnerability that climate change poses from a structural perspective across space. We argue
that the agency and choice implicitly afforded to those that suffer the impacts of climate
change within adaptation literatures proves to be largely normative in the case under
examination here.
The article is structured as follows. First we look to literatures on climate change
adaptation and precarity respectively to develop an approach which draws on the latter
body of work to advance the former. We then highlight the research methods
underpinning the analysis in this article, before moving to an overview of the broader
political economy of Cambodia’s transition. The rest of the article explores precarity and
climate change across the rural and urban. The conclusion looks to draw the various strands
of the article together and move towards a new framing of climate precarity as a means of
developing a more coherent approach to understanding climate change as an issue of power.
Climate change adaptation
The concept of climate change adaption has its roots in policy discourses emanating from the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2001) and elsewhere, and their
recognition of climate change as a sustained and worsening problem threatening human
development (see also The World Bank, 2010). The IPCC’s own definition of ‘adaptation’
is as follows: ‘Adaptation to climate change refers to adjustment in natural or human
systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates
harm or exploits beneficial opportunities’ (IPCC, 2001: 365). The IPCC concurrently
suggests that ‘Adaptation can reduce vulnerability’ (IPCC, 2007: 14). The implication is
that ‘harm’ or ‘vulnerability’ is caused by climate change itself, thus positing adaptation
to climate change as a means of reducing such harm or vulnerability. Conversely, a body of
critical scholarship over the past two decades has highlighted differentiated vulnerability as
existing prior to instances of climate change (Ribot, 2011), the limited nature of ‘adaptation’
in engendering processes of structural transformation (Adger, 2001; Pelling, 2011), and the
problematic pervasion of technocratic approaches to adaptation (Bassett and Fogelman,
2013) at the behest of attention to how structural inequality impedes their success (Adger
et al., 2003; Kelly and Adger, 2000; O’Brien et al., 2007). Most notably, the shift from
adaptation to transformation in recent years (Eriksen et al., 2015; Pelling, 2011) has
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highlighted the limits of adaptive approaches, revealing ‘a fine line and considerable tension
between accommodating change and consciously creating alternatives’ (O’Brien, 2012: 673).
The transformative turn has stressed a need to move beyond adjusting to climate change, as
indicated by adaptation, and to look instead towards changing the very systems that inhibit
adaptation (O’Brien, 2012; Pelling, 2011).
Such critiques have done much to develop the approaches initially put forward by
multilateral agencies; yet, there remains within such literature an inadequate theorisation
of power relations. Specifically, those with insufficient power to enact adaptation or
transformation are more often understood to be ‘vulnerable’ (for example, see Kelly and
Adger, 2000; O’Brien et al., 2007); yet, this is often used descriptively, understood as
embedded in rather than produced by a wider set of power relations. Thus, the emphasis
is on adaptation and transformation as separate questions to that of power in the face of
climate change. As Ribot argues (2011: 1160), ‘Adaptation efforts are noble, necessary and
long overdue, but there are grave risks in calling these efforts ‘‘adaptation’’ rather than
‘‘vulnerability reduction’’’.
In this vein, Taylor (2015: 82–83) looks to recast vulnerability as relational, suggesting
that whilst ‘authors recognise that what they term climate change adaptation is inherently
a question of power because ‘‘adaptation’’ hinges upon the ability to transform prevailing
socio-ecological relations’, an analysis of the underpinnings of such power is too often
‘reduced to a static notion of inequality that requires appropriate social policies’. He
argues for a conceptualisation of vulnerability that locates it within a broader system of
power, drawing on the notion of ‘adverse incorporation’ (Hickey and du Toit, 2007;
Mosse, 2007) to highlight how vulnerable people are not merely ‘outcomes of
inequalities in market access or public goods’, but instead how ‘subordinate groups are
incorporated within profoundly unequal power structures’ (Taylor, 2015: 86). Taylor
goes on to suggest therefore that ‘households are rendered vulnerable not simply
because of a lack of assets, but because they are fundamentally dependent on other
social actors to turn their existing assets into tangible livelihoods and meaningful lives’
(2015: 86).
This conceptualisation of power as central to adapting to climate change offers a strong
path ahead for two reasons. Firstly, it is relational vulnerability as opposed to climate
change that is foregrounded as the reason behind inadequate adaptation, thus Taylor
avoids a form of environmental determinism that is implicit in much of the early IPCC
approach in seeing adaptation as a solution to vulnerability. Secondly, the theorisation of
power stresses the need to understand local contexts, to better elucidate the particular
‘unequal power structures’ within which vulnerable people are incorporated. Such an
approach heeds the call for ‘a more grounded and localized understanding of climate
change’ (Brace and Geoghegan, 2011: 284) which is central to understanding the
complexity of power and thus of adaptation at the local level.
Yet, Taylor’s approach is confined to an agrarian setting, where he argues that ‘This task
[of theorising power] is particularly important when we consider climate change adaptation
in agrarian environments because the latter regularly display deep-rooted inequalities in
control over key productive resources such as land, water, labour and credit’ (2013: 321).
Whilst this is an apt assertion vis-à-vis the particularities of the agrarian context, we suggest
that the increasing phenomenon of rural–urban migration as a means of overcoming rural
distress, prevalent across Southern countries more broadly (Breman, 2007; Bryceson, 1996;
Bylander, 2015b; Rigg et al., 2016; Tacoli, 2009), requires a more spatially expansive
understanding of power relations vis-à-vis the broader economy – a focus that is not
necessarily inherent within ‘vulnerability’ approaches.
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In developing this further, scholarship from critical agrarian literature has highlighted the
fact that the structural transformations taking place across the Global South have seen
industrialisation emerge without the absorption and transformation of former peasantries
into waged workers, as was the case in England in particular (Bernstein, 1996; Bernstein and
Byres, 2001). Instead, millions of small farmers find themselves tied to markets and unable to
reproduce themselves through agricultural production alone, due to a complex and
articulating array of factors such as contracting rural labour markets, declining
commodity prices, the withdrawal of state subsidies for chemical inputs and irrigation,
and environmental change (Araghi, 2009; Bernstein, 2010; Weis, 2007). Such farming
households are primarily forced to reproduce themselves through waged work, largely in
the non-farm sector, and struggle to do so, forced to travel away from rural areas in search
of opportunities (Breman, 2007; Murray Li, 2009; Rigg et al., 2016). Yet industrialisation
and services sector growth across most countries in the Global South have not absorbed the
burgeoning migrant labour populations from rural areas (Araghi, 2009; Bernstein, 2006).
Such farmers-turned-labourers are thus best understood as being part of the proliferating
‘surplus’ labour population emerging from capitalist transformation, where they are surplus
to the needs of capital (Li, 2009).
As such, the ‘vulnerability’ that Taylor (2013, 2015) identifies in agrarian settings requires
some extension to capture the particular conditions of surplus labour across rural–urban
spaces. Specifically, whilst ‘vulnerability’ in Taylor’s rendering and elsewhere (see Mosse,
2007) is expanded to be relational, the concept lacks the academic genealogy of broader
work which has looked to theorise power vis-à-vis markets as they exist in urban and rural
areas. Instead, ‘vulnerability’ is primarily used to indicate the risk of becoming poorer, as
opposed to the structures that forge power relations with regard to the workings of the
market (Green, 2006). We therefore look to the burgeoning literature on precarity as a
means of moving towards a spatially and structurally coherent conceptual lens through
which to understand power in relation to climate adaptation.
Precarity and climate change
Recent decades have seen increasing scholarly and activist interest in different notions of
precarity. The term (‘précarité’) was first employed by Bourdieu (1963) in his research on
temporary workers in Algeria, where it was specifically used to describe the experience of
short-term, insecure work. It was later resurrected by him in a critique of the rise of such
labour conditions across France in the 1990s (Bourdieu, 1998). The term in both these cases
is taken to refer to a sense of insecurity stemming from the particular labour market
condition of short-term, irregular work, where such work is implicitly juxtaposed by the
prior promise of more secure work under the Fordist regime.
The concern with precarity can be seen as part of a broader body of work spanning the
social sciences which explores the livelihood trajectories of the poorest during the past few
decades, as Global South economies have undergone a structural transformation and
become rapidly liberalised.
In the development literature, the livelihoods approach (Ellis, 2000) has most notably
addressed this question. Drawing on Sen’s capabilities framework (1999), the livelihoods
approach examines the trajectories of the poorest, focusing on the issue of power through the
concept of multidimensional capitals – human capital, economic capital, social capital and
so on – as a means of understanding why some are able to forge successful trajectories out of
poverty where others aren’t (Scoones, 2009). This approach has faced a number of critiques,
and for our purposes here, the most notable comes from advocates of a relational poverty
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approach (see Bernstein et al., 1992), which highlights an understanding of power relations
as being forged through the relationships between individuals and broader structures of
power that shape social life, such as class, ethnicity, race, and gender. This contrasts the
more assets-based approach advocated in much of the livelihoods literature, though not all
(Scoones, 2009). Crucially, more recent decades have seen a burgeoning of relational poverty
concepts (Hickey and du Toit, 2007; Mosse, 2003; Pattenden, 2016), and precarity certainly
falls into this broader turn.
The concept of precarity has been taken forward by scholarship highlighting the shifting
nature of work under late capitalism, largely focused on the Global North. As Waite tells us
(2009: 416), ‘Precarious work can be conceived as differing from ‘‘standard work’’ that is
generally seen as full-time employment with extensive statutory benefits and entitlements’.
Most notable in recent years is Standing’s development of precarity through his
conceptualisation of the ‘precariat’, where he argues that a new class of labour in-the-
making is evolving, characterised by workers lacking forms of labour security such as the
promise of employment, of protection in employment against dismissal, of sufficient income,
and so forth (see Standing, 2011: 10). This approach implicitly builds on the previous
relational turn in development studies thinking to highlight how workers in the neoliberal
era are adversely incorporated into burgeoning new circuits of accumulation (see Hickey and
du Toit, 2007). Notwithstanding the numerous critiques of Standing’s work in particular (see
for example Breman, 2013; Frase, 2013), several alternative and opposing views of precarity
have emerged.
The first is around the ontological underpinnings of precarity, as a condition linked to the
specific types of work that have flourished in post-Fordist economies, or as a more general
malaise. Butler’s work (2004, 2011: 13) most notably advances the latter thesis; she draws on
the work of Berlant (2007) to suggest that precarity is both ‘a structure of affect’, and ‘a
heightened sense of expendability or disposability that is differentially distributed
throughout society’. Ettlinger (2007: 323) too advocates such an approach; she argues
‘that precarity crosscuts spheres of life; it infuses life’. Both Butler and Ettlinger thus
transcend the link between precarity and labour market conditions inherent in earlier
approaches, to suggest that it is better understood as emanating from the subjective
experience of life under late capitalism more broadly. In seeking to bridge the divide
between these ontological positions, Strauss (2018: 625) suggests that
the concept of precarity encompasses both ‘labour’ and ‘life’: life is inherently precarious, but
human societies and economies are organized in ways that render some lives more precarious
than others, often but not exclusively through the capitalist wage relation and the division of
paid and unpaid labour.
Thus, in developing our own conceptualisation, we draw on the work of Strauss to
understand precarity as both labour and life, and to blur the distinction between the two
(see also Millar, 2017).
The second debate on precarity centres on the focus within much of the literature on the
Global North, and the implications of this with regard to how precarity is understood. The
first implicit assumption which emanates from a Global North focus is that the apparent rise
in precarious jobs documented in recent decades is the result of a post-Fordist labour regime,
where Fordism in post-war US, or the equivalent era of Keynesian statism in Europe, is seen
as a period of relatively stable job creation (Millar, 2017; Waite, 2009). Yet, as Neilson and
Rossiter argue (2008: 54), ‘If we look at capitalism in a wider historical and geographical
scope, it is precarity that is the norm and not Fordist economic organization.’
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Moreover, the notion that un-precarious jobs are thus a normative goal for the wider
labour movement requires some challenging. Millar suggests that the implicit focus on
Fordism as a point of departure in work on precarity stems from its North-focus
(2017: 6),
Precarity appears new and exceptional only from the perspective of Western Europe and other
highly industrialized countries, where the Fordist–Keynesian social contract was strongest in the
years following the Second World War. In contrast, for most workers in the global South,
precarity has arguably always been the norm even if it has not been called by this name.
Echoing this thesis, Munck (2013: 752) argues that
There is little cognisance that the type of work described by the term ‘precarity’ has always been
the norm in the global South. In fact, it is Fordism and the welfare state which is the exception to
the rule from a global perspective.
Such critiques highlight both the need for further perspectives from the Global South, and
point towards a dismantling of the very underpinnings of precarity as something that is
necessarily worsening or exceptional. Breman and van der Linden (2014) have argued more
broadly that the normative ideal of secure and waged work that underpins concepts like
precarity globally has in fact been a historical exception.
The third and final debate around precarity that we look to address here is around the
issue of agency. One of the central critiques of Standing’s notion (2011) of the ‘precariat’ is
his conceptualisation of their agency, or lack thereof. As Paret (2016: 178) argues, Standing
depicts the precariat ‘as a transformative agent that will lead from below, or as a
disorganised force that must be saved from above’. Paret argues for an approach which
better foregrounds ‘precariat struggles’ (2016: 178) as a means of taking more seriously the
forms of resistance enacted by such marginalised workers (see also Coe, 2013; Coe and
Jordhus-Lier, 2011; Herod, 1997; Paret and Gleeson, 2016). Whilst we certainly heed such
a call, we focus here conversely not on such struggles, but rather on the forces that constrain
worker agency and thus constitute worker precarity, whilst noting that such analysis leaves
out the ways in which the worker agency, understood in the broadest of terms, may also
shape trajectories of capitalism (see Katz, 2004).
We therefore adopt a conceptualisation of precarity where it is understood as both
reflecting the adverse incorporation of labourers into broader circuits of accumulation,
manifest in the specific conditions of an insecure labour market, and also as indicating a
more subjective ontological experience. Furthermore, we explore precarity in a Global
South context, Cambodia, with a view to understanding the specific ways in which
precarity has emerged in the country’s particular power relations, and how this
constrains the agency of those experiencing precarity. In linking this back to the earlier
discussion around climate change adaptation and surplus populations, the use of precarity
in both its labour-related and more subjective renderings allows us to capture the notion of
agrarian vulnerability and urban insecurity, thus enabling us to explore how precarious
rural smallholders become debt-bonded urban labour. The term ‘precarity’ is privileged
over ‘vulnerability’ given the former’s implicit assumption of such precarity being
reproduced by a wider political economy, where the latter is even in Taylor’s rendering
relational but in an agrarian setting. Therefore, climate change adaptation across both
rural and urban spaces is recast as an issue of precarity, and thus understood to emerge
from broader structural determinants of such precariousness, within the particular context
of Cambodia.
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Field methods
This article is part of a broader research project entitled ‘Blood Bricks’, which examines the
nexus between climate change and modern-day slavery in Cambodia (Brickell et al, 2018).
Specifically, the project focuses on how climate change-induced rural indebtedness leads
small farmers from villages across Cambodia to urban, insecure work as debt-bonded
labour in Phnom Penh’s Brick kilns. The project’s emphasis is on the particular ways in
which climate change deepens livelihood insecurity, leading to insecure labour relations on
brick kilns, and the everyday experiences of such insecurity.
Research methods comprise two stages, firstly: semi-structured interviews with 51 brick
kiln workers across 30 brick kilns in the environs of Phnom Penh. Accessing workers on kiln
sites proved to be difficult given their restricted mobility and the continual presence of kiln
owners. Interviews were therefore conducted using a convenience sample, and ethical and
practical considerations were taken in choosing not to undertake a purposive sample. These
were supplemented by 31 further qualitative interviews with other actors such as kiln owners,
union leaders, former kiln workers, residents around the kilns and Buddhist monks to both
triangulate information and provide additional perspectives. Analysis draws on qualitative
data to take seriously the lived experiences of workers on brick kilns, highlighting
perceptions, narrative accounts and commentary from other actors to enliven the
perspectives of kiln workers. Secondly, a total of 308 quantitative surveys were conducted
in three villages that comprise high levels of out-migration to brick kilns. Village A is located
in Kampong Cham province and situated along the banks of the Mekong river, Village B in
Prey Veng province around 50 km east of the Mekong river, and Village C in Prey Veng
province just under 10 km east of the Mekong river. All brick-sending households were
surveyed in each village, and then a randomised sample of other households was also
sampled. These surveys were further supplemented by qualitative interviews with a sample
of labour-sending households and other figures in the three villages.
Data collection comprises both qualitative and quantitative data; however, the former is
primarily drawn on in order to develop the arguments in this article. All interviews were
conducted in Khmer, the researcher is a proficient Khmer speaker and was accompanied by
a local Cambodian research assistant throughout who was fluent in Khmer. Interviews were
later transcribed into English. The extreme vulnerability of those interviewed and the power
asymmetry between workers and interviewers was also a key area of concern. Care was
therefore taken to ensure that kiln workers provided informed consent as far as possible,
no children were interviewed, and that interviews could be ceased at any time if workers felt
uncomfortable. Given the fact that debt-bondage is outlawed in Cambodia, care was also
taken to ensure anonymity throughout the research, and so all interviewees’ names have
been changed to protect their identities, and no locations are specifically disclosed.
Precarious ‘surplus’ populations in Cambodia: An overview
Cambodia has undergone a rapid economic transformation over the past two decades.
Following the devastating reign of the Khmer Rouge in the latter half of the 1970s, the
country underwent a period of stagnation during the 1980s, under the Vietnamese
dominated People’s Republic of Kampuchea, only to be plunged headfirst into
marketisation following the entrance of the UN in 1991, and the subsequent election of a
domestic government (Hughes, 2003). Cambodia’s annual growth has remained relatively
high from 1999 to the present day, not dipping below 5%/annum except for 2009 following
the global financial crisis (World Bank, 2017). In this period, the country has undergone a
rapid process of economic liberalisation, forged by the state government and articulated with
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the conditionalities of various multilateral aid packages that it has accepted (Springer, 2010).
This has involved the rapid proliferation of privatisation and deregulation, including land
titling, tax incentives for foreign capital, and the concurrent burgeoning of foreign direct
investment into export-oriented enterprises (Springer, 2010).
In recent years, Cambodian capitalist accumulation has been dominated by a relatively
small elite characterised by rapid land concentration, and driven by the appropriation of
natural resources within the country and an influx of foreign capital from outside. As
Springer (2010: 4) argues,
. . .what makes ‘actually existing’ neoliberalism in Cambodia distinctly Cambodian is how local
elites co-opted, transformed, and rearticulated neoliberal reforms. This has been done in such a
way that it reinforces existing patron-client relations through a framework which ‘asset-stripped’
foreign resources brought in to support the building of the liberal peace . . . thus increasing the
exposure of the average citizen to corruption, coercion, and violence.
The impacts of this type of growth on rural Cambodia have been particularly profound,
as rural space has also been transformed through neoliberal policies. In particular, the extent
of land privatisation is of note here, with the human rights organisation LICADHO having
estimated that by 2012, 2.1 million hectares of land had been transferred from public to
private hands through land concessions, 400,000 people had been adversely affected; and this
was understood to be a conservative estimate (LICADHO, 2012). Thus, extensive land
titling benefiting external capital has eroded rural livelihood strategies, as formerly
communal land that provided an important source of natural wealth for poorer rural
villagers, through fishing, foraging and cultivation, has now been privatised (Gironde and
Peeters, 2015). Cambodia has also never undergone a Green Revolution-style programme of
state-sponsored agrarian intensification, thus support for developing agrarian productivity
or funding agrarian infrastructure from the government has been scant (Beban and Gorman,
2017). Instead, the shift to a neoliberal regime of development has seen the commodification
of land and agricultural inputs render agrarian production increasingly expensive (Beban,
2014; Parsons, 2017). Rural households are thus shifting to new methods of farming
designed to increase yields, and decrease reliance on labour. Alongside this, the out-
migration of younger household members to find work in the non-farm sector is
leading to tightening rural labour markets, thus rural mechanisation is on the increase
(Chhun et al., 2015).
Furthermore, this is all in a context where Cambodia is routinely named by global indices
as one of the most climate insecure countries in the world (for example, Morton, 2014), driven
by a combination of increasing climatic and environmental shocks (UNDP Cambodia, 2014),
and poor social protection in the face of this (Cook and Pincus, 2014). Cambodia is
undergoing a period of climatic change, with temperature increases engendering complex
impacts across the country, and across Southeast Asia more broadly (Thoeun, 2015).
Rainfall has also altered to vary from long-standing patterns. The immediate impact for
the millions of smallholder farmers across the country is an increase in extreme weather
events, notably floods and droughts, and more erratic patterns of weather in general
(Eastham et al., 2008; Västilä et al., 2010). Regional data also highlight that a formerly bi-
modal pattern of rainfall, affording farmers with peaks in both July and September during the
first half of the 20th century, has increasingly become mono-modal, with a single peak in
September, therefore limiting scope for double-cropping among farmers relying on rainfall
alone (Kimkong and Paradis, 2015). This has varied impacts across the country, as whilst
regions surrounding the Tone Sap lake rely on seasonal flooding for their rice crop, the
increasing variability and extent of such flooding, combined with the impact of water
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infrastructure such as dams, means that farmers are increasingly vulnerable to the impacts of
flooding (Arias et al., 2012). As such, climate change is exacerbating the uncertainties inherent
in rainfed agriculture as a livelihood in Cambodia.
The overall outcome is that social reproduction in rural areas has become increasingly
difficult, and agriculture itself constitutes a decreasing share of national growth (Hill and
Menon, 2014; World Bank, 2015). Thus, as Murray Li (2009) argues, poor, rural
Cambodians are rendered surplus to the requirements of capital more broadly.
Despite significant growth in garments, tourism and construction in particular, urban
industrial and services-sector growth has not been able to absorb those leaving rural areas
behind (Dennis and John, 2011). As such, migration from rural Cambodia is both internal
and cross-border, as rural households are forced reproduce themselves across space
(Parsons, 2017; Parsons and Lawreniuk, Forthcoming; Rigg et al., 2016). Precarity in the
Cambodian context is thus characterised by the inability to reproduce yourself in rural areas
due to poor access to land, ecological stresses and poor state support (Beban and Gorman,
2017; Cook and Pincus, 2014), and low waged, insecure work, that is devoid of social
protections in urban and peri-urban areas (Derks, 2008; International Labour
Organisation (ILO), 2012).
Precarity in the village
The majority of precarious debt-bonded brick workers began their lives as smallholder
farmers in villages across Cambodia. Kiln interviews revealed that in almost all cases,
rural farming households incurred unsustainable debt in rural areas, and then sold these
debts to brick kiln owners. In return, whole families moved from rural households onto
kilns, to work off the consolidated debt-bond over years and even decades.
Looking first to the villages that comprised high levels of out-migration to brick kilns,
household reproduction is shown to be experienced as a precarious endeavour. Specifically,
precarity in the village is manifested through the adverse incorporation of smallholder
farmers into broader circuits of capital, particularly microfinance capital, and felt through
the inability of smallholder households to reproduce themselves through agrarian
production or rural labour, with the impacts of climate change upon agriculture rendering
such livelihoods increasingly insecure. Adaptation to climate change is thus a normative
rather than actually applicable concept, in a context where the agency of such households is
severely restricted.
The primary structural driver behind precarity is debt. Fifty-six per cent of households
surveyed reported that one or more member of the household was indebted, and field
findings revealed that the two main drivers for indebtedness were agricultural expenses
associated with seeking to increase yields, and medical expenditure. Looking first to the
former, the majority of households in our survey did not cultivate cash crops;1 only 14%
of households across the three villages reported doing so. As such, the majority of
households undertook primarily rice cultivation, largely for subsistence needs, with
minimal sales to local markets. Households were looking to expand rice yields through
purchasing chemical inputs, and using a less labour-intensive method of rice production.
Yet, despite savings in terms of labour costs with the new method, households faced
increased expenditure on chemical inputs, requiring credit in many cases. Furthermore,
households with irrigation (as opposed to rainfed agriculture) were more likely to be
indebted across the surveyed villages. The lack of state support for such upscaling reflects
the legacy of Cambodia’s lack of Green Revolution, and the sudden marketisation that
proliferated in rural areas instead. As such, the burden and concurrent risk of improving
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agrarian production, from what remains primarily subsistence across the country (Beban
and Gorman, 2017; NIS, 2016), falls on individual households. Credit therefore represents
both a means of enabling increased production, and a significantly individualised risk.
This is a particular issue in the face of climate change and its impacts on agricultural
productivity, with climatic and environmental changes being widely experienced by the
villagers surveyed. Overall, 99% of respondents agreed that there had been notable
environmental changes in their village over the past five years. Moreover, the material
impacts of this upon household reproduction, and the ability to repay debts incurred to
increase agricultural production, were shown to be profound. Both kiln workers and
householders in villagers repeatedly cited either droughts or floods as a cause of failed
harvests, and erratic rainfall patterns are identified as a key symptom of climate change
along the Mekong delta region more broadly (Arias et al., 2012; Västilä et al., 2010). As
such, debts incurred to undertake productivity-raising were thwarted by the impacts of
climate change, leaving households without the means to repay such debts.
In addition to this, the second most common reason cited for taking on debt was health
expenses. Despite a state-led and donor-backed ‘Health Coverage Plan’ which has been rolled
out across Cambodia since 1996, health provision for the poorest remains scant (Jacobs and
Price, 2006). As a result, out-of-pocket health expenditure for Cambodian households is
shown to represent a significant cost, and one that can have catastrophic effects on the
poorest households (Dalal et al., 2017; Damme et al., 2004). A single occurrence of bad
health is thus enough to tip a poor household into indebtedness (see Krishna, 2010).
Yet, beyond the drivers for taking on debt, it is particularly pernicious nature of
microcredit in Cambodia which is also crucial to forging precarity among rural
smallholders. Initially set up in the mid-1990s as a means of enabling demobilised soldiers
to reintegrate into society through small enterprises, microcredit has seen a considerable
expansion in Cambodia, rising from 300,000 consumers in 2005 to nearly 1.6 million in 2013
(Bateman, 2017). Over the past two decades, the industry has been structurally transformed
from a one-off development project funded by the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) to a deregulated, fully commercial banking-led entity by 2009, and more recently to
a global financial industry (Bateman, 2017), thus signalling a shift in its scope from
developmental to for-profit. This has resulted in the character of financing also changing,
with loan amounts and rates of interest both climbing, as well as a wider remit for who is
eligible. Despite the initial aims of the UNDP-funded programme, loans are now shown to
be used for everyday consumption needs (Bylander, 2014, 2015a), and even for paying off
loans from private lenders (Ovesen and Trankell, 2014). As such, the developmental
potential of microcredit is increasingly being called into question, and instead, as Ananya
Roy suggests in her treatise on ‘poverty capital’ (2010); the poor become transformed into a
new frontier for finance capital.
In linking this broader landscape of debt to the case at hand, farmers-turned-brick
workers’ precarity is shown to be constructed through the articulation of climate change,
ill health, and inadequate state support for agrarian productivity or public health; and
microfinance. Smallholders’ adverse incorporation into both the agrarian economy and
into the system of financial accumulation, represented by microcredit, cements their
material precarity vis-à-vis the market. This notion of precarity marries most closely with
approaches identifying it as emanating from particular labour market conditions (Bourdieu,
1998; Waite, 2009); yet, precarity in this case is expanded beyond more dominant
conceptions of the industrial or services-sector labour markets within such literature, to
include rural smallholders as representative of those that struggle to reproduce themselves
through a combination of subsistence and commercial production, and waged work.
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Crucially, in building on Munck’s call (2013) to look beyond the post-Fordist setting of
the Global North in conceptualising precarity, this struggle for social reproduction in rural
Cambodia is understood to emerge from the particular structural transformation underway
in Cambodia. As set out earlier, the country has seen a shift from a predominantly agrarian
economy dominated by subsistence producers in the 1980s to neoliberalism, with growth
driven by industrial and services sectors comprising relatively low levels of labour
absorption, poor working conditions and low wages (Hughes, 2003; Springer, 2010). This
has come alongside a concomitant rise in rural wage rates, the impacts of climate change,
and scant state support in terms of social protections and agrarian development (Cook and
Pincus, 2014; Parsons, 2017). The precarity of rural smallholders is therefore manifested in
their adverse incorporation into broader systems of accumulation, as farmers and labourers,
and as debtors, as the subjective experience of such precarity foregrounds the sheer lack of
agency experienced by rural smallholders in light of their broader structural constraints.
Sangha,2 a former smallholder farmer who is now tied to a brick kiln through debt bondage,
highlights his experiences,
We do farming, for which we need capital to buy the fertilizer. If we do not have money, we have
to borrow from them [microfinance lenders,] and I sold my land to pay off my debts to them . . . it
was very difficult to grow rice in dry season because we didn’t have enough water. It was also
successful, but for this we needed to use a lot of capital, so we borrowed the money to buy oils,
fertilizer, and it was difficult to pay this back.
Despite being a debt-bonded brick worker, Sangha continues to refer to his livelihood as
‘farming’ in the present tense, suggesting the relative resilience of this livelihood in his
imaginary as opposed to brick work. Yet, the inherent instabilities within farming are also
revealed – to render land a viable means of producing rice, Sangha requires chemical inputs,
for which he is forced to take on credit, which eventually leads to the land itself being sold. The
promise of ‘success’ pushes Sangha into taking on debts; yet, the impacts of climate change in
the form of droughts render such debts unsustainable, and life ‘difficult’. Precarity is thus imbued
with a sense of lacking choice – Sangha tells us matter-of-factly that although rice production is
‘difficult’, it is what he does, and thus taking on debts is a necessity of sorts. Vimean3 is a farmer,
and her son’s whole family works in a nearby brick kiln. She too highlights a lack of choice and
agency in her experience of farming, climate change and indebtedness,
The rainwater isn’t even enough to grow short-term rice. . .It has been like this every year since
my grandparents’ generation. It’s difficult to grow dry season rice. It is easy at first when there is
enough water but this time of the year, there isn’t enough water. Some people have money to
drill wells; people who don’t have enough money have to watch their rice goes bad.
The passive act of watching one’s crop fail, knowing that this failure will trigger a chain
effect of indebtedness leading to the brick kilns, offers a profound insight into the lack of
choice afforded to rural precarious smallholders like Vimean. She goes on to say
people who left to work for the [brick] factories were very poor and couldn’t continue growing
rice due to irregular rain. So that is why they had to go out and find work to earn a living and to
pay back their debts.
The implication is thus that moving to brick kilns is not a choice; rather it represents the only
available option for many, highlighting the constrained agency faced by those living
precarious lives.
Research highlighted how kiln owners use existing kiln workers to recruit indebted
households from their natal villages. Rural indebted households ask kiln owners to pay
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off their all local debtors, and in return, the whole family moves to the brick kiln to work off
the consolidated debt bond. Crucially, the different levels of indebtedness between brick and
non-brick households were stark. Average loan amounts among non-brick households was
US$814.72, whilst among brick households it was US$1380.93. To put this in context, Gross
National Income per capita in Cambodia in 2016 was US$1140 (World Bank, 2016).
Therefore, the decision to approach kiln owners needs to be understood within the
constrained context in which smallholders are operating, forged by unsustainable debts.
As Bylander (2015a: 544) argues, credit in this instance represents a form of coping with
the problems of reproducing oneself in rural Cambodia, rather ‘than offering them
meaningful opportunities to improve their ability to make a living at home’. Once the
coping mechanism of local credit becomes unsustainable, shifting debts to debt-bondage
offers a new coping mechanism for smallholders. As such, in linking this back to the
broader discussion of climate change adaptation, research clearly indicates that the
structural constraints faced by smallholders in the study villages render individualised
adaptation measures a normative ideal at best. Or rather, debt bondage is shown to the
adaptation cost of smallholder farming in a context of climate change.
Ultimately, structural precarity underpins why smallholders are unable to adapt, and also
to constitute their need to adapt, as their inability to reproduce themselves through agrarian
production because of climate change is itself a manifestation of precarity. Therefore, the
very notion of adapting is rendered somewhat futile, given the entanglement of agency
within a broader set of structural constraints. In this vein, smallholder families’ move to
brick kilns represents a choice in a context where there are few others. Climate precarity,
understood as a lens through which we can highlight the problems of climate change as
experienced by precarious smallholders, therefore offers a glimpse into the complex and
articulating constraints of climate change adaptation. Beyond the rural, research revealed
that labour migration to brick kilns served to reproduce and even deepen precarity as
opposed to alleviating it. Furthermore, the vagaries of climate change remain forceful in
deepening precarity for debt-bonded labourers on brick kilns. Climate precarity is thus
forged and reproduced across space.
Precarity on the kiln
Life as a debt-bonded brick worker on brick kilns located in the environs of Phnom Penh is
difficult and unsafe. Brick work is made up of several stages: firstly, workers in rural or peri-
urban areas undertake excavation of clay sites. These are usually rural lands that are
purchased by kiln owners, often from indebted families that go on to become debt-
bonded brick workers themselves. Excavated clay is then taken to kiln sites, where it is
left in large mounds. Workers transport excavated clay from these piles into brick-
moulding machines, with different kilns comprising different levels of mechanisation with
regard to the transportation and moulding of clay. Once moulded, bricks are left to dry in
the sun, and stacked in a particular patter which affords each brick sufficient exposure to air.
Air-dried bricks are then transported to kilns, where they are fired for several days. Kilns are
often make-shift structures built with bricks, which comprise one or more large openings for
workers to continually stoke fires and add fuel. Once fired, hot bricks are taken out and left
to dry once again, before being picked up by middlemen that transport them on to
construction sites across Phnom Penh. Within this broader set of activities, brick workers
are forced to work long hours, expose themselves to unsafe conditions in the form of brick
dust, smoke emerging from kilns, heat from kiln fires, and also to use unsafe machinery,
particularly brick-moulding machines that have been shown to cause amputations.
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Kiln workers and their families live and work on kiln sites, work is paid piece rate, on a
daily basis, and kiln owners (Bassett and Fogelman, 2013) take a cut from wages in order to
contribute to repayments towards kiln workers’ debts. Therefore, working families look to
increase their productivity and through this, their repayment rate to kiln owners. They are
not allowed to leave kiln sites until debts are repaid, and if they ask to do so in order to visit
family in their home village, it is not uncommon for kiln owners to insist that one or more
family members, often a child, remain on the kiln as ‘collateral’. Brick workers are also
compelled to bring their families with them to the kiln. This is often because kiln owners
reported preference for families over single workers as they are less likely and able to flee
kilns. Unionisation and resistance among brick workers was not evident. An interview with
representatives from the Building Workers’ Trade Union of Cambodia highlighted the
difficulties of organising among brick workers given their isolation and relative
incarceration on kiln sites, and the kiln owners’ reticence to allow union representatives
on-site. Furthermore, interviews with brick workers continually highlighted feelings of
gratitude towards kiln owners for having paid off their mounting debts. There was
conversely little evidence of resistance towards kiln owners.
Brick workers are ultimately compelled to undertake unsafe work, and prevented from
leaving kiln sites through disciplining force of debt bondage. Yet, bonded brick workers
should not be viewed as isolated from Cambodia’s wider economic development. Debt-
bonded brick workers are part of Cambodia burgeoning construction sector, which has
been a key driver of the country’s growth for over a decade, and largely financed by
foreign capital flows (Hill and Menon, 2014). Construction has climbed steadily in its
contribution to GDP in Cambodia, and in 2016 it was the largest contributing sector to
the country’s 7% GDP growth (World Bank, 2018).
Phnom Penh’s literal ascent has demanded cheap bricks at a rapid rate, fuelling the brick
industry. More specifically, our research traced bricks from kilns comprising debt-bonded
labour to eight high-profile construction projects across Phnom Penh. As Roesch et al. have
highlighted with regard to India, in industries such as brick-making, the particularly time-
consuming and unsafe working conditions required mean that capital looks to forge a pliant
and immobile labour force. They do so by seeking out particularly vulnerable populations,
specifically those adversely incorporated into the economy due to social stigma and
economic marginalisation in the Indian case. In this case, it is families adversely
incorporated into circuits of microfinance debt that are rendered sufficiently precarious
for kiln owners to exploit. Indebtedness becomes debt bondage; a transition exacerbated
by the impacts of the climate. As such, the drive for cheap bricks in Phnom Penh has led to
conditions where severe labour exploitation is engendered.
Debt-bonded brick workers are thus shown to be contributing to profits in the
construction sector for both domestic and foreign capital, through a severely exploitative
labour relation (Guérin, 2013; Lerche, 2007). This labour relation is best understood as
unfree, a form of severe exploitation (Banaji, 2003; Lerche, 2011) where agency over the
type of work and conditions of work are inhibited for the worker. ‘Unfreedom’ in this regard
is understood as part of a broader continuum of labour relations, as Lerche argues (2011: 7),
most of the labour relations which today are classified as unfree labour share characteristics with
a wider set of relations, both with regard to the underlying processes which lead to their creation
by capital and concerning conditions of work and pay for labour.
This concept thus sees unfree labour as being reproduced by the broader workings of
market capitalism, rather than constituting an exception to it or an anachronism (Brace and
O’Connell Davidson, 2018; LeBaron, 2014; Strauss and McGrath, 2017).
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In deploying this concept through a precarity lens, precarity is shown to manifest both in
the material adverse incorporation of workers into construction sector growth, and from the
experience of such adverse incorporation – the subjective experience of unfreedom, which
sees workers’ agency and mobility constrained through debt bondage. Yet, is such precarity
still shaped by climate change? Our research highlights that it is.
Having seemingly left a livelihood where the vagaries of climate change profoundly
impacted success, kiln workers find that such vagaries follow them to the kiln. Brick kilns
in the environs of Phnom Penh were almost all uncovered, so that for the periods when
bricks were left out to dry, both after being moulded and after being fired, they are exposed
to the elements (Figure 1).
Rainfall is therefore an issue, bricks cannot be left to dry when there are rains for fear of
degrading the quality of bricks. As such, in these periods work stops, and immobile workers
are forced to borrow increased amounts from kiln owners for their daily expenses, therefore
deepening their indebtedness. Piseth,4 a debt-bonded kiln worker, highlights the
despondency of this situation:
During the wet season, we can work only 2–3 days within the period of a half-month . . . We’re
just sitting and waiting for the rain to pass, then we break up (clay) soil, and collect it for being
crushed. This is our hardship. Even though we want to leave, we’re not permitted . . . I try to
borrow a small sum, 5,000 Riels (around US $1.25) from any of my relatives. For our boss, as he
feels pity when we have nothing to eat he [loans] me 5,000 Riels or 10,000 Riels (around
US $2.50).
Piseth’s account emphasises once again the constraints faced by precarious workers on brick
kilns. The bonds of debt tie them to kilns, such that they are unable to exercise their agency
to find new work in new spaces. Piseth is thus an ‘unfree’ worker, and climate change
Figure 1. A female worker removed fired bricks from a kiln. (Photograph by Thomas Cristofoletti, 2017,
copyright Royal Holloway, University of London)
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exacerbates the material and subjective experience of unfreedom in forging periods of work
insecurity. Furthermore, given that rainfall patterns in Cambodia have become increasingly
erratic due to climate change, deepening uncertainty over rainfall is reproduced as precarity
in the lives of brick workers. Chea, a debt-bonded brick worker, highlights the experience
of this,
The rain this year seems like ... It’s different from the past. In the past years, the rain had its own
months and seasons. For example, it was raining only 1 to 2 months, and it stopped raining for
4 to 5 months. For this year mostly it has the storms and it’s often raining. It’s often raining so,
I can’t really work at the brick kiln. If there are no rains and storms, I could continuously work
and have the money.
The temporal shift in rainfall patterns engendered to some extent by climate change is
captured in Chea’s palpable temporal uncertainty over his income. He also clearly notes a
change in levels of uncertainty, suggesting fixed patterns are no longer discernible with
regard to rainfall. Yet, it is Piseth and Chea’s adverse incorporation into the construction
sector, through an exploitative unfree labour relation, that actually renders them precarious.
Kiln owners profit from climate vagaries, as they loan workers money for their daily
expenses and thus ensure that a reduction in overall debts remains difficult or even
impossible. Figures from one brick kiln offer a stark portrayal of such profits. The total
cost of producing one pallet of bricks – 200,000 bricks – was US$3316, with labour
constituting 21.1% of production costs. The pallet is sold at a rate of US$8000; therefore,
the gross profit comes to US$4684, and labour costs make up just 8.8% of the sale price.
Given the Gross National Income per Capita quoted earlier in this article was US$1140 in
2016 (World Bank, 2016), kiln owners are shown to be deriving considerable profits through
the exploitation of workers, deepened by the impacts of climate change. Yet, for Piseth and
Chea and their fellow workers, their precarity is deepened by the same forces of climate. The
subjective experience of this is reproduced across the rural–urban divide, as there remains a
sense of powerlessness and resignation across accounts of rural precarity that is echoed in
urban narratives. As such, in returning to the issue of climate change adaptation, the
continued precarity of smallholder farmers, now unfree brick workers, renders them
literally and figuratively immobile in the face of climate change. Adaptation is thus
rendered once again a normative concept, given the constraints placed upon workers’
agency, this time through their adverse incorporation into construction sector growth.
Conclusion
In drawing together the different threads of this article, we suggest that a climate precarity
approach offers a means of reconciling the rich conceptual insights of precarity, understood
as simultaneously subjective and objective, with debates around climate change adaptation.
The article explores the case of debt-bonded brick workers in the environs of Phnom Penh,
formerly indebted smallholder farmers, to highlight that material precarity, specifically the
adverse incorporation of smallholders-turned-brick workers into broader circuits of
accumulation, renders their livelihoods more exposed to the changing vagaries of the
climate. Crucially, in both rural and urban areas, precarity is shown to be forged through
the adverse incorporation of smallholders and brick workers, first into the agrarian
economy, then into circuits of debt-based accumulation through microfinance, and finally
into construction sector accumulation. The material relation of precarity constrains the
agency of farmers and brick workers such that adapting to climate change is rendered
normative at best. Otherwise put, debt bondage is the adaptation cost of climate precarity.
914 ENE: Nature and Space 2(4)
The article has ultimately suggested that calls for adaptation need to reconstituted, in
line with the work of Taylor (2015), to better conceptualise how vulnerability is shaped by
broader relations of the market. In shifting from a vulnerability to precarity focus, the
article draws on the lens of precarity, increasingly deployed by geographers over the past
decade or so as a means of capturing both the particular labour market conditions
emerging in post-Fordist countries under neoliberalism, and the subjective experiences of
everyday life in the current era more broadly, to begin the task of theorising power. The
article has contextualised rural indebtedness and labour migration within the broader
context of Cambodia’s particular transition, where the encroachment of markets in rural
areas, combined with low labour-absorption in urban work, has engendered dispossessed
labour migrants. We have concurrently also focused on developing the lens of precarity,
looking beyond its current geographical underpinnings to re-situate it within the particular
context of Cambodia’s transition, and moving beyond the ontological divide in deploying
it both as a means of capturing labour market conditions, and the subjective experience of
precarious life. Overall, rather than adaptation to climate change, we suggest that a fruitful
path ahead is to deploy the concept of climate precarity, which asks instead how precarity
is constructed and experienced, and how climate change articulates with and often
exacerbates this process.
Finally, the article also speaks implicitly to literatures on climate mitigation, understood
according to the IPCC as a ‘human intervention to reduce emissions or enhance to the
sinks of greenhouse gases’ (2018: 773). In highlighting how climate precarity is forged
through social relations and deepened, rather than created, by climate change, the novel
approach offers scope to address how mitigation strategies can look beyond emissions/
sinking greenhouse gases alone, to a more holistic view of mitigating the impacts of
climate change upon people through addressing the structures that render them
precarious. This is a fruitful path for future research, and ties our approach into
broader literature on climate and environmental justice (see Martinez-Alier et al., 2016)
which looks to address the uneven distributional impacts of climate change upon the
world’s population. It also links to Marxist ecology (Foster, 2000; Marx, 1976), which
foregrounds capitalism as a system driven by exploiting labour and appropriating nature,
thus highlighting anti-capitalist struggles as the means of addressing exploitation and
environmental degradation.
Highlights
. The article initially suggests that climate change adaptation literature does not focus
enough on the constraints faced by the working poor in the Global South in seeking to
‘adapt’ to the impacts of climate change.
. This article draws on the concept of ‘precarity’, understood as both a structural labour
market condition and a subjective experience, to develop a ‘climate precarity’ lens.
. The article explores how smallholder farmers in rural Cambodia become indebted due to
structural poverty exacerbated by climate change, and how the move to urban areas sees
them face similar conditions, as the vulnerabilities exacerbated by climate change follow
them to brick kilns.
. The paper thus explores a severe case of precarity through such farmers-turned-bonded
labourers to highlight the structural constraints facing many in the Global South vis-à-vis
climate change. In doing so it advances ‘climate precarity’ as a means of focusing on the
structural constraints facing many that are vulnerable to climate change.
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Notes
1. ‘Cash crops’ refers in the Cambodian context to non-rice crops, as rice has traditionally been
understood as a subsistence crop. This is slowly changing as the government is beginning to
support measures to increase rice as an export crop (Saruth et al., 2014). However for the
purposes of this study, ‘cash crops’ excludes marketable rice, and refers to all other crops.
2. Interview with Sangha, male brick worker, 2 November 2017.
3. Interview with Vimean, female brick worker, 22 February 2018.
4. Interview with Piseth, male brick worker, 3 November 2017.
5. Kiln owners were generally local businessman looking to increase profits through a new sector, the
majority had non-brick enterprises. Some of the older kiln owners were former farmers. The
majority we encountered where Cambodian Khmer, with a minority of Vietnamese-origin kilns
owners as well.
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